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Introduction 
 
In most countries, local transport services by bus, which are a major component of 
regional passenger transportation systems, are subject to the scrutiny of policy makers for at 
least two contextual reasons. First, while the passenger transport services have always been 
highly regulated, the public transportation policy is now experiencing deregulation and/or 
privatization in an industry where urban transport companies are heterogeneous in their 
ownership status, which can be public or private, as well as in the diversity of transport 
modes they offer (bus, train, underground, and tramway). Second, while the modal share of 
bus transport services has been declining for several decades in most developed economies, 
the growing environmental concern raises the calls for promoting urban mass transit (as 
opposed to private car).  
This chapter is aimed at deepening our understanding of the functioning of 
competition in the local bus transportation industry and to evaluate its effectiveness. It 
provides an overview of the competitive constraints that are at work in the industry as 
discussed in the economic literature, and sketches empirical tests to check whether the 
intuitions provided by the economists are in line with the reality of the industry. To address 
these various issues, the first three sections of this text survey the economic literature on 
bus competition, emphasizing the case of UK which is used as a benchmark. We suggest 
that earlier contributions, proposed in the late eighties, (i.e., just after the deregulation of 
the industry) are very often based on unrealistic assumptions, mainly chosen because the 
authors lack of a sufficient perspective on the effects of deregulation. Hence, we focus on 
the most recent literature, which we attempt to survey as completely as possible. The 
objective is to draw the main conclusions or results which are shared by the analysts or 
researchers on how this economic activity functions. In the last section, we propose some 
methods to empirically test these main predictions of the economic literature.  
The analysis is summarized as follows. Section 1 reviews what it is empirically 
known about the technological features and the economic performance of bus operators.
i
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Section 2 focuses on the analysis of demand for urban transport services. Section 3 
analyzes the competition in local bus service industry, leading to the conclusion that 
operators do not compete in prices but mainly in frequency.The last section concludes.  
 
 
Cost and production analysis 
 
The cost and production analysis addresses three main issues. First it is aimed at 
measuring economies of scale, economies of density and economies of scope which are key 
structural elements to describe in economic terms the technology behind an industry. 
Second, it should provide a measure of the level of technical efficiency to evaluate the 
performance of firms. Finally, it discusses the definitions for the output variables. In the 
literature, either supply indicators (e.g., vehicle-kilometres or seat-kilometres), demand-
related output measures (e.g., passenger-kilometres or the number of passengers) or 
multidimensional output definitions are used. (See De Borger and Kerstens (2006) for a 
discussion on the choice of output measures.) 
 
Technological characteristics 
 
Let us first review some characteristics of the technology for bus transport services, 
such as returns to scale, economies of density and economies of scope. It is a common 
result that bus companies experience increasing returns to scale. (See Filippini and Prioni 
2003, Farsi et al. 2006, and Farsi et al. 2007,.) More specifically, it seems that smaller 
firms benefit from increasing returns to scale, as opposed to larger firms which exhibit 
constant or even decreasing returns. (See Viton 1997, Matas and Raymond 1998, and 
Kerstens, 1999, ,.) For the British bus industry, Cowie and Asenova (1999) estimate that 
small companies of fewer than 200 buses experience some economies of scale. They also 
find that the size of such returns varies with the company type whether it is public limited, 
private limited, or municipal. Sakano and Obeng (1995) find increasing returns to scale for 
the U.S. urban transit industry. Overall a significant number of empirical studies are in line 
with a U-shaped average cost function exhibiting increasing returns to scale for the smaller 
operators, which become constant and finally decreasing as companies’ size increases. 
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In most empirical studies, economies of density are frequently found regarding the 
bus companies’ technology. As already pointed out, the distinction between economies of 
density and economies of scale is very important in industries that provide their services 
over a network. In these cases, the firm size is more closely related to the size of the 
network than to the output provided over that network. For this reason it is important to 
distinguish cost changes that occur because of output changes only and cost changes that 
occur because of a proportional network and output change. Among studies which estimate 
that bus companies fail to operate at an efficient density are Farsi et al. (2006) and Filippini 
and Prioni (2003) on the Swiss market, Matas and Raymond (1998) for Spain and Shaw et 
al. (2005) for Taiwan. It appears that bus operators could obtain cost-saving benefits by 
extending their output scale. 
Some articles have focused on the multi-modal side of the industry and have asked 
whether a bundling of operations from different urban transport modes (bus, train, metro 
for instance) is preferable to a separated configuration. They converge to the conclusion 
that economies of scope are significant in the industry, and that their results are in favour of 
integrated multi-modal operators. Farsi et al. (2007) conducted a study in Switzerland and 
found increasing returns to scale in almost all outputs. They consider that these returns, 
combined with cost complementarities, can be considered as a suggestive evidence for 
natural monopoly. Viton (1993) also finds positive economies of scope and concludes that 
together with the nature of economies of scale, they support the formation of larger multi-
modal systems in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
 
Efficiency 
 
The recent literature on performance of operators of local bus services shows that 
there still exists a substantial level of inefficiency in this industry. However, huge 
differences exist over time and across countries. Cowie and Asenova (1999) find a high 
degree of inefficiency in the British bus industry which they interpret as an indicator of 
wasteful competition. However, Cowie (2002) estimates that the average efficiency has 
improved in the U.K., suggesting that mergers may have allowed existing group companies 
to operate closer to the optimal level of output. Heseltine and Silcock (1990) for the British 
operators find that the main total unit cost reduction was achieved by productivity 
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improvements. Working on a sample of Spanish cities, Garcia-Sanchez (2009) finds that a 
majority of municipalities are technically inefficient, mainly due to scale inefficiency. This 
is a similar result to Kerstens (1999) who indicates that inadequacies in scale are the major 
source of poor performance in her sample of French urban transport service operators. 
Some studies though are more optimistic in their measurements of efficiency, in particular 
in the UK. Viton (1997) finds that 80% of bus systems are efficient in the U.S. Wunsch 
(1996) who compares 178 European urban transport companies claims that two British 
firms, in the cities of Manchester and Sheffield, are among the first on his list in terms of 
technical performance. However, he takes into account only dominant bus companies and 
he admits that his result depends crucially on data quality. Most studies underline the 
dispersion in the efficiency measures they obtain within the same country or area. (See 
Kerstens 1999, De Borger and Kerstens, 2006, with the exception of Salas, 1998, who finds 
that, in Sweden, the levels of efficiency are very similar among companies.) 
 
Private / Public ownership 
 
Contrary to a common argument, there is substantial evidence in the literature that 
private bus companies do not operate more efficiently than public companies. Ownership 
type does not seem to be a crucial determinant in the firms’ performance, as shown in 
Odeck and Sunde (2001) and Garcia-Sanchez (2009) on the Norwegian market and Viton 
(1997) who shows that U.S. public and private systems share the same distribution of 
technical efficiency. Fazioli et al. (1993) found no relation between technical efficiency and 
ownership among a sample of Italian urban transit firms precisely because of the absence of 
effective competition for both public and private operators and strong regulation. Filippini 
and Prioni (2003) underline that the results in their study on a Swiss sample depend on the 
specification of output and network variables. However, if we can assert there is no strong 
evidence of a higher efficiency for private firms, some studies do estimate they perform 
better. Cowie and Asenova (1999) find privately owned firms are not more technically 
efficient, although they exhibit a considerable level of managerial efficiency. They find that 
values of increasing returns to scale for small companies not only vary with the ownership 
type (public/private) but also with the actual form of private ownership. Relevance of 
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ownership as a determinant for performance is also found in Kerstens (1996) and De Rus 
and Nombela (1997) on the French and Spanish market respectively. At this point, the 
literature is considered inconclusive regarding the impact of ownership type on efficiency. 
 
Subsidies 
 
There is some evidence that subsidies are associated with an increase of operating 
costs. In particular, Kerstens (1996) corroborates this assertion when analysing a sample of 
French urban transit companies. Sakano and Obeng (1995) on U.S. transit systems report 
that subsidies lead to excess use of labor relative to capital and excess use of fuel relative to 
capital and labor.  
 
Incentive contracts 
 
Several recent studies have revealed the positive effects of incentive contracts on 
technical efficiency. In Kerstens (1996), empirical findings confirm the importance of 
appropriate incentives in contracting for monopoly. Risk-sharing agreements seem to 
stimulate the performance of organizations. These results for French operators are 
confirmed by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a) who develop a method which should help to 
clarify the choice of regulation in the urban transport industry. They conclude that cost-plus 
contracts are dominated by any type of second-best contract. These results are in line with 
those of Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) who find that operators under cost-plus contracts 
exhibit a higher level of technical inefficiency than operators under fixed-price agreements. 
De Borger and Kerstens (2006) survey other European studies which exhibit that high-
powered incentive contracts improve efficiency. 
 
Competitive tendering 
 
The available evidence suggests that competitive tendering may improve 
performance. These results are exhibited by Hensher and Wallis (2005) who review the 
international successes and failures of competitive tendering from ten developed countries. 
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De Borger and Kerstens (2006) in their survey give a more detailed description of the 
effects of competitive tendering. 
 
Methodologies / Discrepancies 
 
It is important to bear in mind that all these performance analyses differ in several 
aspects. First, there exist several approaches to estimate efficiency on the basis of observed 
data. Efficiency, as measured by a deviation from the unobserved cost or production 
frontier, can be estimated by means of parametric and non-parametric methods aimed at 
determining the production or cost frontiers. On the one hand, parametric methods require 
the specification of a functional form for the frontier, a popular one being the flexible 
translog cost function. On the other hand, non-parametric approaches do not need to specify 
a functional form; they construct the frontier by enveloping the data on inputs and outputs 
by piecewise linear hyperplanes, as proposed by the extensively used data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) method. Both methodological strands have advantages and weaknesses, 
related to the presence (or not) of measurement errors or the requirement to specify 
functional forms. A detailed description and discussion of these frontier methodologies are 
presented in Lovell (1993) and Brons et al. (2005) respectively. 
A second source of differences in the measurement of efficiency comes from the 
definition of the output variable. A significant number of studies conclude that operators’ 
performances differ substantially depending on the output specification considered. Supply 
indicators (e.g., vehicle-kilometres or seat-kilometres) or demand-related output measures 
(e.g., passenger-kilometres or the number of passengers) have been used. 
A third crucial aspect in the model specification for measuring efficiency is that 
models should account for relevant measures of service and network characteristics. Bus-
transit services have been recognized as very heterogeneous across countries and even 
cities. This is confirmed by Brons et al. (2005) and De Borger and Kerstens (2006) who 
find significant and consistent effects of the type of database, region and output 
measurement method. Fourth, some authors underline the need to decompose the measures 
of efficiency into two components (allocative and technical). For example, Viton (1997) 
suggests that the result of similar efficiency distributions between private and public firms 
might hide the fact that private systems would be more allocatively efficient. Also, 
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according to him, the distinction between managerial and organisational efficiency seems 
relevant in this industry, particularly in measuring the impact of ownership type on 
efficiency. This conclusion is confirmed by Cowie and Asenova (1999). (See also 
Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 2002b.) 
 
Further research 
 
Although the literature on measuring efficiency in the urban transport industry is 
extensive, some aspects still have to be investigated more thoroughly. An international 
comparison on the effects of deregulation and competition on efficiency would be of high 
interest. Also, only a few studies take into account the presence of other transport modes on 
the market. Indeed, the presence of economies of scope and the call for limiting private car 
traffic to the benefit of urban modes because of environmental policies make this multi-
output aspect of the industry particularly relevant. Further analysis of the decomposition of 
efficiency into its several components to better understand the effects of ownership and 
deregulation on efficiency seems to be a next step in the research agenda. 
 
 
Demand analysis 
 
In this section, we review the values of bus demand elasticities found in the 
literature. We discuss different types of elasticities. First, we look at the own price 
elasticities. Note that the own price elasticity of the demand that a firm faces is always 
more elastic than the aggregate elasticity of market demand. This is because there are fewer 
substitutes for a product at the market level than at the firm level. An example would be the 
substitution between competing bus services on a market as opposed to substitution 
between different transport modes on this market. Second, we present the measures of 
cross-price elasticities of demand which evaluate the substitution patterns between 
competitors (transport modes or services). For example, the cross-price elasticity from bus 
to car tells us the percentage increase in car demand following a one percent increase is bus 
fare. In the bus-transit industry competition can come from other bus operators, as well as 
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other transport modes (train, metro, car...). Finally, we report the values of income and 
service quality elasticities found in the literature. 
 
Own price elasticities 
 
It is a common result in the literature that the demand for bus-transit is not elastic in 
the short run. Most studies on bus-transit own-price elasticities agree on a value of -0.4 and 
this result is summarized in four surveys on urban demand by Goodwin (1992), Oum et al. 
(1992), Dargay and Hanly (1999) and Balcombe et al. (2004). 
These studies emphasize that authors now agree on the necessity to consider 
dynamic changes in these own-price elasticities. All studies allowing elasticities to vary 
over time, that is to say, allowing demand to adjust to changes in price in the long-run, have 
agreed that demand in the long run is more elastic than demand in the short run. The role of 
dynamics in urban transport demand is the objective of the survey conducted by Goodwin 
(1992) who estimates that long-run elasticities range between 1.5 to 3 times higher than 
short-run elasticities. He concludes that a time-dependent specification for the demand is 
preferred. In the literature (Goodwin 1992, Balcombe et al. 2004) the long-term response 
should be expected in a period of 5 to 20 years according to the authors. Only Matas (2004) 
on the Spanish market finds that 95 percent of the effects are realized within 3 years. As 
shown in Table 2.1, the values for long-term own-price demand elasticities vary from -0.4 
to -1.3. However, values significantly greater than 1 are rare in the literature. Among the 
articles displaying the highest values are Romilly (2001), Dargay et al. (1999) and Gilbert 
and Jalilian (1991) on the British market. On the other hand, a study conducted by Deb and 
Filippini (2010) on the Indian market leads to relatively small values of long-run elasticities 
which the authors interpret as the effect of the low level of development in India and the 
fact that public transport is still a necessity there. 
That long-term are higher than short-term elasticities has the following implications. 
First, the full behavioural response to fare changes cannot be properly identified by means 
of unlagged time-series models. Now demand models estimated on cross-section data can 
only reveal long-run price elasticities. Second, in this industry, the range of responses open 
to people is larger in the long run. Car ownership decisions require time to be implemented. 
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It is well known that this dynamic aspect of demand is an important consideration in 
implementing policy strategies. 
Another important finding of the literature on own-price elasticities for bus-service 
demand is that the estimated measures vary with the type of ticket purchased by customers. 
The common result is that demand for a single ticket is more elastic than demand for a 
travel pass. Instead of building a price index to analyse the impact of a change in this price 
on demand, some authors have disaggregated these effects with respect to the different 
categories of tickets available to the customers. De Rus (1990) estimates fare disaggregated 
elasticities for bus-transit in Spanish cities and finds that data disaggregated by ticket fare 
provides a deeper understanding of demand responses. As he finds that price sensitivity 
decreases as we move from single tickets to the travel pass, he concludes that an aggregate 
approach fails to allow explicitly for shifts in demand between ticket types and that the role 
of cross-effects between ticket-types is key for the pricing policy. These results are in line 
with other studies on aggregate data, like Tegner and Holmberg (1998) on the Swedish 
market, and on micro data as in Hensher (1998) and Taplin et al. (1999). However, these 
last two analyses report smaller values for the elasticities. Matas (2004) in a more recent 
article with aggregate data on the Spanish market confirms these previous results and 
concludes that there is scope for a more efficient non-uniform pricing policy with positive 
effects on demand while minimising the negative effects on revenue. 
 
Cross-price elasticities / Substitution effects 
 
A change in fare for a transport mode can lead a customer to switch to another 
competitor, within the range of all available urban transport modes available (private car, 
train, bus, metro, or others). These substitution effects between travel modes are important 
when analysing competition and we present here the main literature findings on these 
measures.  
The common result in the literature is that these substitution effects between modes 
are of a small magnitude in the short run. However, some authors consider that these 
findings, combined with higher long-run own-price elasticity for car and bus use, make 
modal shifts more feasible than often assumed (Goodwin, 1992). Hensher (1998) who 
distinguishes between fare classes finds that, in the Sydney metropolitan area, the largest 
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cross-elasticity between private car and train travel pass is 0.335 in the event of an increase 
in the price of car utilization. He also finds that there are more changes between modes for 
a given fare class than between fare classes within modes. The strongest cross-mode 
substitution for a given fare class (excluding car) occurs between train and bus single 
tickets with cross-elasticities of 0.067 and 0.057 for train-to-bus and bus-to-train 
respectively. Taplin et al. (1999) who aim at improving the methodology presented in 
Hensher (1998) estimate that the most significant differences observed between the two 
approaches are a large decrease in the elasticity of demand for car with respect to the price 
of a ticket for a single trip called Bus Single (from 0.066 to 0.018), and a large increase in 
Bus Single with respect to car cost (from 0.116 to 0.212). Matas (2004) looks at cross-price 
elasticities between ticket types and between transport modes. According to his results, bus 
users are sensitive to both bus and underground prices and quality, whereas underground 
users are only sensitive to underground characteristics. However, he also concludes that 
there is not enough information to understand the impact on modal shifts from car to public 
transport. Dargay and Hanly (1999) observe that the cross-elasticity between bus patronage 
and motoring costs appears to be negligible in the short run and about 0.3 to 0.4 in the long 
run. According to them there is some price substitution between bus and car use, although 
comparatively small. Balcombe et al. (2004) find that, in urban areas outside London, 
public transport use is sensitive to car costs but car use is much less dependent on public 
transport costs. Oum et al. (1996) in a study of the Dutch urban market estimate that the 
relative price of private car must rise significantly to induce a significant number of car 
drivers to switch to public transport modes. 
 
Trip purpose / Peak and off-peak demand 
 
Fare elasticity is different for different journey purposes. Trips made to go to work 
or to school are considered as peak demand, whereas trips for leisure or shopping are much 
more flexible in the time of the day and correspond to an off-peak demand. One would 
expect fare elasticity to be higher for off-peak demand than for peak demand where 
customers do not have much choice but to travel. In their review of the literature, Balcombe 
et al. (2004) observe that the mean off-peak elasticity for buses (precisely, -0.5) is at least 
twice the peak elasticity (i.e., -0.2). This is in line with the World Bank report by Oum et 
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al. (1990).and a literature review by Fowkes et al. (1993). Ivaldi and Viauroux (1999) also 
find significant differences in urban trip purposes. 
 
Income elasticities and car ownership effect 
 
Dargay and Hanly (1999) observe that, in the UK, the income elasticity for bus 
services, which includes car ownership effects, is negative in the long run. This is in line 
with the literature and suggests that bus transport is an inferior good. (See Bresson et al., 
2003, Balcombe et al. 2004.) The negative long-run elasticity reflects the effect of income 
through its positive effect on car ownership and use, and the negative effect of the latter on 
bus patronage. They estimate that income elasticity ranges between -0.5 to -1 in the long 
run. However, as car ownership approaches saturation the income elasticity can be expected 
to become less negative. Romilly (2001) finds a positive value of 0.61 for his long-term 
income elasticity, suggesting that the economic growth has outweighed the inferior good 
aspect of the service. Matas (2004) also finds a positive value for the income elasticity 
(precisely, 0.15) in Spanish cities. He explains the difference with Dargay and Hanly 
(1999) by the higher population density of Spanish cities which makes them better suited to 
public transport use than to car use. 
 
Service Elasticities 
 
Regarding service elasticities, Matas (2004) estimates a service elasticity of 0.24, 
although he explains that, in aggregate studies, a very crude proxy for the quality of service 
is used, and it is difficult to give an adequate interpretation of the estimated elasticities. 
Quality is defined in different ways in different studies making uneasy the comparison of 
their values which are ranging between 0 and 1. De Rus (1990) finds a high coefficient of 
variation between the different cities.  According to Deb and Filippini (2010) and as 
expected from the literature, service quality is the most significant policy variable as it has 
the largest impact on travel demand. Bresson et al. (2003) show that, in France and in the 
U.K., fare and service elasticities are of a similar magnitude (although opposite in sign), so 
that an increase in fares combined with an equivalent increase in service (vehicle 
kilometres) would have only marginal effects on patronage. 
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Methodologies / Discrepancies 
 
Several approaches are used in the literature to compute reliable measures for urban 
transport demand elasticities. There is common agreement that variances in values for the 
different elasticities are influenced by several factors, both related to methodological 
aspects and to features of the industry. In particular Nijkamp and Pepping (1998) have 
carried out a comparative analysis of elasticity values of transport demand resulting from 
twelve studies in various countries. Their analysis indicates that the difference between 
aggregate (macro-) and disaggregate (micro-) models, as well as with other assumptions, 
explain the variance in the values of elasticities across studies. They also find that the 
country involved, the number of competitive modes, and the type of data collected are 
important factors in accounting for the level of elasticities. These conclusions confirm the 
findings of Oum et al. (1992) who survey the elements that impact the estimation of 
demand elasticities in different studies. Oum et al. emphasize the need to take into account 
intermodal competition because, otherwise, own-price and cross-price elasticities are biased 
given that they ignore some of the competing services. They also underline that different 
functional forms can result in widely different elasticity estimates, even with the same set 
of data. Note that models also differ with the choice of the definition of the dependent 
variable (whether one considers journeys or passengers-kilometres) and the way fares are 
aggregated into a price index. They observe that results differ according to the area or 
country under analysis, which have their own features (in particular for their urban-transit 
services). This is why they highlight the fact that disaggregated data would lead to a wide 
range of elasticities as they would reflect unique market conditions. Dargay and Hanly 
(2002) find a considerable variation in the fare elasticity across counties, ranging from 0 to 
-3 in the long run. Bresson et al. (2003) in their comparative study between France and the 
U.K. confirm the relevance of taking into account countries’ heterogeneity. The study by 
Dargay and Hanly (1999) corroborates the findings of Oum et al. (1992) and Nijkamp and 
Pepping (1998). First they find a large variance of elasticities across counties in the U.K.; 
second, they conclude that estimated elasticities from different studies are not directly 
comparable. More precisely, they assess it is inappropriate to apply the value of an 
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estimated elasticity for different circumstances or to average the values of elasticities from 
different studies.  
 
Further research 
 
The preceding review of the literature on urban transport demand highlights some 
areas for improvement in the methodologies adopted so far. First, models for disaggregated 
data have rarely been estimated and they would constitute a considerable enhancement in 
urban demand studies. They would allow us to capture the specific effects of the markets 
under scrutiny, such as different ticket fares, trip purposes, and customer categories. An 
aggregate elasticity hides these specific effects. Second, more structure could be applied to 
the models and the interaction between supply and demand could be taken into 
consideration. Third, the literature suggests that a comprehensive representation of the 
market is important as we observe significant differences in characteristics across cities. 
Competition from other modes should be taken into account to avoid bias in the measures 
of elasticities. Fourth, functional forms have to be chosen carefully as they can lead to very 
different results, even applied to a same dataset. Econometric testing of different model 
alternatives would be a useful part of the research agenda. 
 
 
Competition analysis 
 
Entry 
 
As a general rule, a firm enters the market only if it can earn positive profits. When 
entry happens on a significant scale, it is expected that the incumbent reacts. In the early 
deregulation period, the literature focusing on bus competition suggested that entry may be 
a relevant issue and has shed light on several cases of entry in local markets. Entry usually 
occurs on the periphery of the incumbent’s main market area, particularly if the incumbent 
has a local reputation.
ii
 Some smaller operators have attempted to enter on a small scale 
hoping not to invoke a response from the incumbent firm. The literature suggests however 
that entry strategies have been unsuccessful in most cases. (See Preston, 1988, for an early 
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analysis. Note that the literature does not provide any further evidence of successful entry 
in the 90s or the 00s.)  
To explain why entry was unsuccessful in the early deregulation period and why it 
was scarce in the years following deregulation, an important argument is that the industry is 
not perfectly contestable. As an indication that the industry is not contestable, we list as a 
first step the usual conditions which guarantee that a market is perfectly contestable. As a 
second step, we discuss why these conditions seem not to be met in the bus transportation 
industry. 
According to Shepherd (1984), Baumol (1987), and Banister (1997), a perfectly 
contestable market requires the following conditions: 
 Entry is free; 
 Entry is perfectly reversible, i.e., sunk costs are zero; 
 The incumbent and the entrant have access to the same technology; 
 The incumbent and the entrant have equal access to all customers in the market, i.e., 
consumers are not loyal to the incumbent’s products; the services of the incumbent 
and the entrant can be easily accessible (for instance bus terminals can be used by 
all operators); 
 There is an active second hand market for capital assets (e.g., the entrant has access 
to “cheap” buses for its rolling stock); 
 The regulator imposes time lags to prevent sudden changes in prices or withdrawal 
of services by the incumbent firm, e.g., “hit and run” strategies, where the entrant 
enters the market over a short period and enjoys high prices, can be implemented.  
In a contestable market, any attempt by incumbent firms to earn excessive profits 
would be unsuccessful. Furthermore, even if there is just one firm offering the service, this 
firm would be engaged in average cost pricing and have zero profits. If positive profits 
were obtained, competitors would enter the market and undercut the incumbent’s prices and 
profits. Hence, the important idea is that the mere threat of entry forces the incumbent not 
to behave as a monopoly despite the intrinsic properties of the market which enable it to do 
so. 
The economic literature is unanimous in stating that the local bus transportation 
industry is not perfectly contestable. In the very first years of deregulation, Preston (1988), 
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Button (1988), Beesley (1990), and Evans (1991) suggest that many factors prevent the 
markets from being contestable: 
 Existence of barriers to entry: The access to bus stations and the use of travel cards 
have acted as barriers to entry; the incumbent may have more convenient terminal 
positions; entrants may not obtain access to bus stations; information points may be 
manned solely by the incumbent firm’s staff and entrant firms may be located at the 
least attractive stands in the bus station; other practices include the blocking of a 
rival’s bus, occupying a stand or using couriers to persuade customers to use one 
company’s buses in preference to another. Barriers to entry may have been 
underestimated at the moment of deregulating the market. 
 Existence of sunk costs: Trained staff (managerial, administrative and platform) is 
costly. An entrant finds it difficult to hit and run if its employees are not highly 
qualified.
iii
  
 Practices which raise rivals’ costs: Operators may withhold surplus buses from the 
second hand market, hoping that the price of old buses would increase as their 
availability decreased, hence making entry to the local market more difficult.  
 Economies of experience, economies of scale, economies of density, and economies 
of scope: The incumbent may have a larger network than the entrant and may 
therefore be able to offer more attractive area-wide tickets than the entrants; the 
incumbent may be better known.  
 Incumbents can reduce prices very quickly (usually within 24 hours). 
During the 90s, these initial intuitions are confirmed. Evans (1990 and 1991) insists 
on the fact that the incumbents can change their prices immediately in response to entry 
since operators are allowed to change fares without notice. As a result, incumbents can 
enjoy super-normal profits on high density routes. Moreover, the “experience” input is 
essential to explain the tactical advantage of the incumbent firm, given that it is usually 
better informed about different aspects of providing the service. Beesley (1990) claims that 
barriers to entry are numerous: For instance, garage locations and other property rights play 
a key role since they directly affect the likelihood that local markets can be opened to 
competition. The law may itself impede entry: For instance, entrants are required to remain 
at least 6 weeks in the market; sub-contracting to drivers is restricted.  
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Banister (1997) contributes to this view of the industry when he states that the 
characteristics of the industry and the strategic actions of the incumbent both impede the 
local transport market from being contestable. In addition to the previous factors, Banister 
proposes the following characteristics: 
 The need to replace the ageing bus fleet, which requires greater capital investment 
than the smaller companies are able to obtain or willing to risk; 
 The fear of competitive disadvantage of the smaller operators against the larger 
operators is significant in the bus industry;  
 Large and small companies do not have access to finance on equal terms. 
Incumbents tend to have weaker risks of bankruptcy than entrants because they have 
a larger size and have a bigger purse. The incumbent may own routes elsewhere 
which earn high profits which can be used to cross subsidize more less competitive 
routes;  
At the same time, Banister sheds light on the possible actions to be taken by the 
incumbent to reduce the arrival of entrants; these actions are:  
 Build up consumer loyalty; 
 Establishing a reputation for toughness by maintaining a presence in the market; 
 Reorganize the network so that economies of scale and density can be obtained;  
 Maintain ownership of fixed assets such as terminal, booking and maintenance 
facilities.  
Banister thus concludes unambiguously that “the theory of contestable markets does 
not apply to the bus industry. In 1985 it may have been attractive to accept the 
contestability arguments, but this does not seem to be true anymore ten years after, since 
the size of operations seems important. The role of the small operators is reduced to 
competing through the tendering process for the socially necessary services.” 
After 2000, the initial propositions listed above, on why the industry is not 
contestable, are corroborated and new claims are made on this issue. First, De Borger and 
Kerstens (2006) suggest that the rolling stock capital of entering firms has the 
characteristics of a sunk cost. More importantly, the incumbent’s strategic actions impede 
entry: 
 Incumbents can easily cut prices and adjust schedules;  
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 The incumbent operates the fixed facilities (a central bus station for instance) 
available that are crucial to exploit network economies (interconnections between 
different lines or sets of lines), given that the demand structure is characterized by 
complementarities between lines. 
Second, Langridge and Sealey (2000) emphasize the idea of the economies of 
experience enjoyed by the incumbent. They note for instance that the confederation of 
Passenger Transport in the UK (the major lobbyist for bus operators, see http://www.cpt-
uk.org/) believes that the incumbent operator always has an advantage over the entrant 
though knowledge and experience, resources (staff), infrastructure, and reputation.  
New strategic behaviours are emphasized as well. Some of them are related to the 
idea of combining competitive services and subsidized concessions allocated to operators 
though competitive tendering. In particular, Langridge and Sealey (2000) note that entrants 
could minimize barriers related to lower knowledge and experience by entering from a 
contiguous market in which they had already gained some knowledge and experience 
and/or entering a local bus market on a small scale, which could be achieved by obtaining 
contracts with the local authority.
iv
 At the same time, many incumbents are eager to enter 
into the new quality partnerships with local authorities, even if this entails supporting high 
costs of investment in new vehicles and related infrastructure. This suggests that they are 
looking for long term partnerships through the creation of local monopolies.  
Finally, as suggested by Van der Veer (2002), under entry threats, the incumbent 
may run more buses and increase the frequency of the service (compared to a situation 
where it is protected from entry) to avoid leaving profitable gaps. Wang and Yang (2005) 
corroborate these findings; they suggest that deterrence through an increase of the service 
level is a dominant strategy for an incumbent under various market conditions, which in 
turn explains the high levels of service in many industries. Accommodation occurs mostly 
on routes where demand is high. Blockaded entry occurs on routes where demand is low. 
 
Competition in price or frequency 
 
Early theoretical models on bus competition have usually been based on strong 
assumptions which were in most cases unrealistic: 
 All operators face the same costs; 
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 All operators and passengers have complete information about services and fares; 
 Operators have information about demand; 
 Each passenger has a preferred departure time and is indifferent between immediate 
backwards and forward rescheduling;  
 Traffic conditions are such that journey times are the same throughout the day; 
 Departure times and fares of other operators are fixed. 
(See Evans 1987, and Preston 1988, for a survey.) 
Moreover, it has been suggested that service quality matters and is therefore a key 
factor in bus competition. (See Dodgson et al. 1992 and 1993, Dodgson and Katsoulacos 
1988, Bly and Oldfield 1986, and Glaister 1985 and 1986.
v
) In particular, minibuses have 
been considered as relevant actors in theoretical frameworks with quality differentiation, 
where competition can be implemented on a horizontal perspective where firms compete in 
fixed time schedules and prices. Regular buses were thought as cheap and slow services, 
while minibuses were associated with lower travel time and higher prices. 
These different assumptions have been, to various degrees, criticized later on. The 
most important criticisms have been related to the assumptions of quality differences and 
price competition. Preston (1988) suggests that consumers have difficulties in perceiving 
quality differences. Moreover consumers’ loyalty to a particular firm seems to be 
unrealistic: Users usually board the first bus that arrives. A model’s outcome of two firms 
offering distinct qualities of service and charging different fares has not been as common as 
might be expected.
vi
 Such a model of competition would probably be more relevant in 
explaining inter-modal competition.  
Thus, it seems to have been accepted that competition has tended to take the form of 
service wars with fares matching. Passengers board the first bus that arrives, hence making 
frequency the key factor for competition. Competition in fares has been mainly restricted to 
branded ticketing such as system passes, return ticketing, multi-rider tickets or discount 
vouchers; branded ticketing is thus seen as a tool for operators to increase the consumer’s 
incentives to be loyal to one specific company.- it is an attempt by operators to develop 
strategic barriers to entry. (See Fernández and Muñoz, 2007.) 
Later on, many authors, such as Van Reeven and Janssen (2006) and Wang and 
Yang (2005) have confirmed these early intuitions. Price competition (and therefore price 
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reduction) is not particularly prevalent in the bus industry.
vii
 Operators have limited scope 
for meaningful product differentiation that could make consumers loyal.  
However, on long distance services such as intercity bus services, consumers’ 
loyalty and price competition (through higher services quality) are more relevant. In this 
case, quality matters, and ticket prices constitute an important fraction of the generalized 
price paid by consumers. Hence, product differentiation on long-distance routes makes 
entrants resistant to pricing and scheduling responses of incumbent operators. Scheduling 
competition is more stable in this case.  
 
Random schedules 
 
The previous section suggests that competition mostly takes the form of frequency 
wars. Analysts then go a step further when they explain that the arrival time of a bus at a 
stop is random. 
Oldale (1998), Ellis and Silva (1998), Van Reeven and Janssen (2006) and Gomez-
Lobo (2007) all agree on the fact that the incentives for price competition are smaller than 
what was expected, even if more than one operator is present on a local transport market. 
Two main reasons explain this result: First, users do not particularly care for quality 
difference, and second, they incur a cost if they want to shop around for the lowest priced 
bus. Contrary to Evans (1987) which assumes that operators’ services are scheduled, these 
authors consider some degree of uncertainty surrounding arrival times at bus stops. In their 
model, users arrive at a stop and will wait for the arrival of the next bus; an important 
assumption is that the distribution of passengers across time is uniform, i.e., there are no 
masses of passengers clustered around departure points. The optimal reaction of the bus 
operators consists then of randomizing arrival schedules at the bus stop, and setting the 
highest possible prices.  
Given that consumers do not differentiate one bus company from another, random 
frequencies have to be expected for the following reasons: Some buses may bunch together 
or some may be alone at a given position in time and space. In the first case, each operator 
has an incentive to drive just in front of the others. Thus, bunching cannot be an 
equilibrium. A profile where each bus is alone in a position cannot be an equilibrium either, 
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since buses have an incentive to fall back and drive just in front of the next bus that is 
following behind. These techniques are known as head running and leapfrogging.
viii
 Hence, 
randomizing the arrival at a bus stop is the best strategy for each operator competing on the 
same route, and this forces the rivals to guess the arrival time of their competitors. A 
striking example is the case of Manchester in the UK, where the first two years of 
deregulation were characterized by services changing between 1500 to 2000 times 
annually. Bus companies cannot credibly provide timetable information. In these 
conditions, competition does not guarantee low prices. 
 
 
A research agenda 
 
The economic literature proposes a number of arguments as to why bus competition 
might be limited in liberalized industries. Several reasons could explain such a situation: 
First, the technology used in the industry favours large and experienced operators and 
therefore impedes the entry of new competitors on an equivalent scale. Second, the fact that 
the transportation service occurs on short distances restricts the incentives of the consumers 
to look for the cheapest operator and/or the company offering the highest quality standards. 
Price competition is therefore likely to be very limited, even on routes where more than one 
operator is present. Note that, where there is no regulation providing incentives to bus 
companies to comply with the time schedules, there is no guarantee of a proper 
coordination of consumers at bus stops, which again limits the scope for competition. 
As pointed out above, most of the contributions drawn from the economic literature 
are theoretically derived, although based on experts’ knowledge and experience. Although 
these theoretical arguments are intuitive and convincing, they often wait to be empirically 
validated. There are potential avenues of investigation. 
First, one should test the contestability of the market. It is well known that, if a 
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, then the associated industry is highly 
concentrated or is operated by a single firm. In this case, the presence of too many 
production units prevents the efficient size of the industry being reached, which could be 
socially costly. Without entering into the details of this theory, this result invites us to 
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evaluate the level of economies of scale and scope, which is usually performed by means of 
the estimation of cost functions. To do so one can use data at the depot or firm level. Now, 
the question of the adequate level of disaggregation to measure output in a network industry 
is still open and subject to research. However, if estimating firms’ cost functions is crucial 
to characterize the economic fundamentals of the bus industry, recall that such an exercise 
is not immune from other constraints that the firms are facing, like the regulatory 
conditions. For instance, the local regulators may impose different quality targets, or the 
driving conditions may vary from one urban network to another, and this may explain cost 
differences across local areas.  
Second, another set of evidence supporting the non constestability of the bus 
industry can be achieved though the detection of predatory pricing: Following Motta 
(2004), predatory pricing implies that the incumbent sets low prices for a period and 
sacrifices short-run profits, so that the entrant believes that positive profits cannot be 
obtained. When the entrant leaves the market, the incumbent then increases prices and 
reaches high profits again, which in the long run outweigh possible losses incurred by 
foreclosing entry. Note that observing that entry occurs is not enough to conclude that the 
market is competitive or that there are no predatory practices. To properly detect predation, 
prices should be compared to marginal and average costs. Following Motta, a test of 
predation could be implemented as follows. First, from the estimated cost function, we can 
evaluate total and marginal costs. Second, actual prices must be compare to these estimated 
costs: i) If the price is above total average costs, then the presumption is that the firms are 
not taking predatory actions; ii) if the price is below total average costs but above marginal 
costs, then predation should not be presumed, but the burden of proof is on the side of the 
competition authority; iii) If the price is below marginal costs, then there is a case for 
predation. Again note however that these tests should not be applied without taking into 
account the regulatory and competition constraints. Indeed regulation of prices and services 
or competition from other transport modes could clearly affect the pricing strategies of bus 
companies. 
Third, one should test the theoretical prediction that, companies do not compete on 
prices at the route level in the short run. There are at least two ways to test this assertion. 
There is a direct approach that consists of estimating a structural model of the industry that 
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comprises a demand function and a pricing equation. This approach could be implemented 
using models specified along the line of the econometrics of differentiated products 
markets. (See Davis and Garces, 2010, for a presentation of these models.) There is also an 
indirect approach that it is easier to carry out. It is indirect in the sense that it tests a 
necessary condition not a sufficient condition, namely that the number of firms on the 
market has no effect on the price level. This approach relies on the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm which states that the structure of a market determines the operators’ 
pricing conduct and therefore their profitability. The ability to obtain significant profits is 
inversely related to the number of firms and/or their market share, and thus is positively 
correlated with concentration. If operators do not compete on price, as suggested by the 
economic literature, a non-significant long-lasting relationship between the price and the 
variable measuring the degree of presence of firms on the market should be obtained. Note 
that one should similarly test for the impact of the market structure on frequencies. 
The research agenda is thus particularly rich. It is also urgent as the effectiveness of 
competition in the bus industry becomes a crucial issue in many countries over the world. 
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i
 Note that De Borger and Kerstens (2006), Brons et al. (2005) and Berechman (1993) have surveyed the 
literature on technical efficiency for bus transit. 
ii
 Note moreover that, during this period, several factors have favoured entry; these factors are: The 
management of the entrant firm has personal knowledge of the area chosen for entry; or the entrant may have 
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hired former employees of the incumbent firm. Beesley (1990) notes that the population density and the 
incumbent’s initial market power are other factors which influence positively the likelihood of entry. 
iii
 Highly skilled employees are so important in the production process that it is not uncommon to observe bus 
operators attempting to recruit a rival’s staff by offering higher wages and better work conditions. 
iv
 They also shed light on the fact that, if the incumbent is unsuccessful in the tendering process, it may 
attempt to provide subsequently a commercial service in order to force the withdrawal of the rival of the 
tendered service. 
v
 See also Nash (1985), for a discussion of Glaister’s assumptions. A more recent contribution on differences 
in service quality is Yang et al. (2001).  
vi
 Note that, currently, there are a number of low cost/‘no frills’ bus companies in towns across the UK that 
compete with higher quality offerings by the larger operators.  (e.g. Whippet bus in Cambridge). 
vii
 Recently, price competition models have been proposed by various authors. See for instance Zhou et al. 
(2005). Their model is however more relevant to describe bus operators’ habits in developing countries such 
as China and other Asian countries or modernized cities with high-density population such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
viii
 Other older “bad habits” of bus operators are discussed in Forster and Golay (1986). They entail “hanging 
back” (the buses go slowly so as to pick up as much traffic as possible), “missing out a bus stop” (if the driver 
decides that there are to few passengers to stop for), “turning” (an nearly empty bus turns around before the 
end of the route and go back in the opposite direction), or “overtaking”. 
